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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL JURISDICTION: Bingo Operations on Keservation
In Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth' the Seminole Tribe brought an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Butterworth,
sheriff of Broward County, Florida, in anticipation that Butterworth would arrest bingo players in the reservation's bingo hall
for violating a Florida statute. The statute permitted bingo operations by certain qualified organizations subject to restrictions by
the state. The court found that the Seminole Tribe's operation of
bingo halls does not conflict with the grant of civil jurisdiction
over Indian tribes given the state under Public Law 280. Citing
Bryan v. Itasca County,2 the court concluded that "states do not
have general regulatory power over the Indian tribes" because
Congress did not expressly confer such power in Public Law 280.
The court also determined that bingo operations were "not
against the public policy of the state of Florida." The Seminole
Tribe therefore was not subject to state regulation of tribal bingo
operations.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Wrongful Taking Claims Are Not
Within Subject Matter Jurisdiction of District Court
In Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, NR. 80-1878, 8 Indian L.
Rptr. 2102 (8th Cir., June 1, 1981), the Eighth Circuit upheld the
district court's dismissal of the tribe's fifth amendment complaint
and quiet title action against the United States and the state of
South Dakota. The tribes asserted that the 1877 ceding of the
Black Hills to the United States constituted an unconstitutional
exercise of the power of eminent domain under the fifth amendment. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, stating that there was no waiver of sovereign immunity by
the United States and also dismissed against the state because of
the fact that the United States was an indispensable party. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the enactment of the Indian
Claims Commission Act' deprived the district court of subject
matter jurisdiction by expressly providing an exclusive remedy for
wrongful taking claims by Indians.
1. No. 80-5496, 8 I.L.R. 2168 (5th Cir., Oct. 5, 1981).
2. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).

1. 60 Stat. 1049, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 et seq. (1976).
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FISHING RIGHTS:
United States v. Washington, No. 77-1397, 8 Indian L. Rptr.
2122 (9th Cir., May 18, 1981)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
order enjoining enforcement of the state of Washington's "Buy
Back Program" against Indians. Under the program, the state of
Washington purchases and resells commercial fishing vessels, and
it forbids the use of the resold vessels in any commercial fishing
in Washington, by both Indians and non-Indians. In affirming
the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit cited the 1976 decision in United States v. Washington.' This case held that the
Treaty of Medicine Creek 2 granted various Indian tribes a right to
an actual share of certain valuable species of fish and that the
state police power regulations could not be used to unduly impair
this right. The Ninth Circuit held that Washington's BBP had the
effect of impairing the Indian fishing rights under the Treaty of
Medicine Creek by driving up the price of vessels that could be
used for commercial fishing, and hence affirmed the district
court's order enjoining enforcement of the Buy Back Program
against Indians.
United States v. Washington, Nos. 79-4447 and 79-4472, 8 Indian
L. Rptr. 2126 (9th Cir., April 20, 1981)
Members of the Samish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie, Steilacoon,
and Duwamish Indian tribes asserted that they should be allowed
to participate in the treaty fishing rights established in the 1976
case of United States v. Washington. ' Their contention was based
on the fact that their members were descendants of the Treaty of
Medicine Creek signatories. The district court held that since
these tribes were not recognized by the United States, they did
not have treaty rights. Although affirming the decision, the Ninth
Circuit stated that the district court's basis was wrong and the
fact of federal nonrecognition was not decisive. The circuit court
said that the key issue was whether some defining characteristic
of the original tribe persisted in the evolving tribal community.
1. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 1086 (1976).
2. 10 Stat. 1132, Dec. 26, 1854.
1. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 1086 (1976).
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This was to ensure that the group claiming treaty rights was a
group named in the treaty. The court then held that no such
defining characteristic existed because total assimilation had occurred; hence, these groups could not claim treaty rights. The
court rejected appellants' claim that they lost their cultural cohesion through the actions of the United States government, first,
because their ancestors were given inadequate reservation, and
second, through the assimilation policy adopted by the federal
government.
United States v. Oregon, 8 Indian L. Rptr. 2171 (9th Cir.,
September 10, 1981)
A federal district court enjoined virtually all Yakima tribal
fishing for the spring chinook, a salmon that spawns above the
Bonneville Dam in the Columbia River basin. In appealing the
order granting the preliminary injunction, the Yakima Tribe
asserted the injunction abrogated rights guaranteed by treaty to
fish on their reservation without interference. The court, in denying that a violation of treaty rights occurred, states: "If states can
regulate treaty fishing in the interest of conservation, then, a fortiori, a federal court with jurisdiction over all parties may do the
same." The court also rejected the tribe's contention that the injunction violated the standards established in Sohappy v. Smith'
which required that modifications of Indian fishing rights must
apply the least restrictive method of perserving the salmon. The
court refused to hold "clearly erroneous" the findings of the trial
court and affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction.
Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians v. Bateman, 8 Indian L.
Rptr. 2159 (9th Cir., August 31, 1981)

The Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians sought declaratory
and injunctive relief to protect their alleged fishing rights on the
Columbia River. The District Court of Oregon rejected their
claims that the right to fish was based on the laws, treaties, and
Constitution of the United States, and that such right was
aboriginal. The Wahkiakum appealed the district court's decision
granting summary judgment for the defendants and urged that

1. 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969).
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because they are affiliated with the Quinaults and Quillehutes,
signatories of the Treaty of Olympia, they have the right to fish
traditional Wahkiakum waters of the Columbia. The court rejected this argument, and found appellants' reliance on Halbert
v. United States' to be misplaced. In Halbert the Chinook Indians' post-treaty affiliation with the Quinault Nation was held to
affirm entitlement to allotment rights on the Quinault Reservation. Here the court found that the Wahkiakum have the opportunity to exercise fishing rights on the Quinault Reservation, but
this right extends only to the usual and accustomed Quinault
fishing grounds, which do not include the areas on the Columbia
River claimed by the Wahkiakum. Further, the court found that
appellants' claim to aboriginal fishing rights on the Columbia
River was extinguished by Congress by the Act of August 24,
1912, whereby a cash settlement was made with the Wahkiakum
in return for land cessions and relinquishment of all rights, including fishing rights. Summary judgment for defendants was affirmed.
FOOD STAMP ACT: Antone v. Block, 8 Indian L. Rptr. 2138
(D.C. Cir., August 10, 1981)
This action was brought by a group of individual Indians, Indian
tribes, and two Indian organizations to challenge the Department
of Agriculture's administration of federal food programs on Indian reservations under the Food Stamp Act of 1977. Appellees
argued that the department violated the congressional mandate
for "expeditious implementation of the Act" and the Administrative Procedure Act.' The legislative history of the Food
Stamp Act reveals that Congress envisioned a six- to nine-month
period from the effective date of the Act to the issuance of implementing regulations; the department took twenty-one months
to publish final regulations. In addition, appellees argued that the
time-table provided for in the regulation for processing applications from Indian organizations, 150-240 days, violated section
1303 of the Act. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of appellees and amended the regulations to provide for a
period of no longer than 150 days for processing applications
from Indian-related programs.

1. 283 U.S. 753 (1931).
1. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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The court found it could not determine whether the delay in issuing the regulations violated the expedition requirements
because there was no evidence in the record as to other matters
demanding attention from the department during that period. In
reference to the time-table for processing applications contained
in the regulations, the court found that there was a rational basis
for it and that it was fully supported by the rule-making record.
Finally, the court determined that the district court's modification of the time-table "contravened the clear and valid legislative
command of the [Administrative Procedure Act] that regulations
are not to be disturbed unless they are so irrational or unsupported by substantial evidence as to violate 5 U.S.C. 706(2)."
MINING: Austin v. Andrus, 8 Indian L. Rptr. 2140 (9th Cir.,
February 2, 1981)
This suit was brought by members of the Navajo Tribe that were
displaced by strip mining activities on the Navajo Reservation,
seeking relief as "displaced persons" within the meaning of the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act of 1970. The district court granted summary judgment for the government on the grounds that the mining project
that displaced the plaintiffs was under the direction of a nongovernment company and did not constitute a "federal program"
under the wording of the Act. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this
holding, ruling that the Act provides relocation benefits only to
those displaced by a written order of the government. The court
held that plaintiffs' grievance was with the tribe rather than the
federal government.
MINING: Crow Tribe v. Montana, No. 79-4321, 8 Indian L.
Rptr. 2142 (9th Cir., July 13, 1981)
The Crow Tribe sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
the state of Montana's imposition of state taxes for coal mined
on the Crow Reservation and from off-reservation deposits held
in trust for the tribe. Mineral leases for the mining of the coal
have been granted by the tribe to non-Indian companies. In 1975,
Montana enacted statutes imposing a severance tax and a gross
proceeds tax on coal operators for all coal mined and sold in the
state. In 1976 the Crow Tribe enacted its own coal severance tax,
which applies only to coal mined on the reservation. The Crow
tribe took the position that the incidence of the Montana tax is
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on the tribe and as such is invalid as an unauthorized direct taxation of tribal mineral holdings. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the incidence of tax is on the non-Indian mineral lessee.
The court rejected the tribe's argument that the state tax was an
impermissible infringement on the tribe's ability to levy its own
severance tax. Following Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville, I the court held that each taxing entity is free to impose
taxes, as "neither tax by its terms precludes the other." The state
of Montana may, however, force the tribe to choose between imposing its own tax, which in effect discourages coal mining, or of
foregoing tax revenues altogether. Last, the court found that
although a state tax is not invalid merely because it reduces tribal
revenues, this particular case involves a special threat to tribal
sovereignty. Finding the complaint adequate to support a cause
of action against Montana, the court reversed the district court's
dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. To succeed at
trial, the tribe must show that the taxes substantially impair its
ability to govern or to develop tribal resources, and that the tribal
interests outweigh the state's legitimate purposes in levying taxes.

WATER LAW: State Has No Power to Regulate Water Use on
Reservation
In Colville ConfederatedTribes v. Walton, No. 79-4297, 8 Indian
L. Rptr 2089 (9th Cir., June 1, 1981), the circuit court held that
the state of Washington had no power to regulate water use on
the Colville Reservation. The case first arose when the Colville
Tribe sought to enjoin Walton, a non-Indian owner of allotted
lands, from using surface and ground waters in the No Name
Creek basin, which is located entirely within the boundaries of
the Colville Indian Reservation. The state intervened in the
district court, asserting it had authority to grant water permits on
the reservation. The district court held that the state could
regulate the water from No Name Creek as long as it was not
reserved for Indian use. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that
the state's regulation of the water in the No Name system was
preempted by the creation of the Colville Reservation. The court
relied on FPCv. Oregon,' which held that water use on a federal
reservation was not subject to state regulation absent explicit
recognition of state authority.
1. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
1. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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